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Abstract 
According to recent analyses, Bumby’s RAPE scale of rape-supportive cognitions about 
women and sexual assault is comprised of two factors. Excusing rape serves to reduce 
abusers’ culpability for their offending, and ascribing blame to victims, while justifying rape 
is associated with a sense of sexual entitlement. The distinct effects of these factors on rape 
judgements have not yet been investigated. We examined whether these belief clusters 
differentially explained judgements of perpetrator innocence after priming cues related to 
each of them. We used a cross-sectional design (N = 217) to test our hypotheses. As 
predicted, we found that excusing rape cognitions contributed to exaggerated innocence 
judgements when the victim paid the bill on a first date (potentially indicative of romantic or 
sexual interest). However, contrary to expectations there was no evidence that participants 
justified rape when the perpetrator paid the bill. Implications for conceptualising the 
functions of rape-supportive cognitions are discussed. 
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Excusing and justifying rape cognitions in judgements of sexually-coercive dating 
scenarios 
Rape-supportive cognition, broadly defined as incorrect or maladaptive attitudes about 
women and/or sexual relationships, have been implicated as key drivers of coercive sexual 
behaviour (Gannon, 2009; Malamuth, 1981, 1986; Marshall & Barbaree, 1980; Ward & 
Beech, 2006; Ward & Siegert, 2002). In recent times, however, there have been increasing 
levels of social discussion about the role of such attitudes in the general community, 
particularly in relation to claims that particular aspects of our society can be deemed ‘rape 
cultures’. This notion assumes that there are large swathes of the population who endorse 
myths about rape, rapists, women, and the victims of rape offenders (Burt, 1980; Suarez & 
Gadalla, 2010), and that these beliefs lead to low conviction rates for rape offences (Burt & 
Albin, 1981; Hammond, Berry, & Rodriguez, 2011; Temkin, Gray, & Barrett, 2018). 
A range of theoretical and conceptual models have outlined the various ways in which 
rape-supportive cognitions may be expressed. In early work, Scully and Marolla (1984) 
interviewed a large sample of convicted rapists and identified cognitions which clustered into 
five themes: women as seductresses, women mean yes when they say no, most women 
eventually relax and enjoy it, nice girls don’t get raped, and guilty of a minor wrongdoing. 
These models are typically based around the idea of implicit theories, which operate as 
mental schemas about the world, and the relationships between people within it. Ward (2000) 
theorised that specific implicit theories that guide these interactions in sexual offenders. In 
rapists, Polaschek and Ward (2002) proposed the following implicit theories by examining 
standardised questionnaire measures of rape-supportive cognitions: women are 
unknowable/dangerous, women as sex objects, entitlement, the male sex drive is 
uncontrollable, and dangerous world. Polaschek and Gannon (2004) subsequently analysed 
interviews with rapists and found empirical support for each of these in their transcripts. 
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Explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of rape-supportive cognitions support the idea that 
these beliefs are multidimensional in nature (for a review, see Maruna & Mann, 2006). The 
Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale (IRMA; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999), for 
example, is a 45-item measure comprised of seven themes: she asked for it, it wasn’t really 
rape, he didn’t mean to, she wanted it, she lied, rape is a trivial event, and rape is a deviant 
event). Similarly, Feild’s (1976) Attitudes Towards Rape (ATR) scale was found to be 
comprised of eight underlying factors/themes: woman’s responsibility in rape prevention, sex 
as a motivator for rape, severe punishment for rape, victim precipitation for rape, normality 
of rapists, power as a motivator for rape, favourable perception of women after rape, and 
resistance as a woman’s role during rape. Despite this, the three most commonly used 
measures of rape-supportive cognitions are typically used in a manner that suggests 
unidimensionality. Burt’s (1980) Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) scale is comprised of 19 
items (e.g., “In the majority of rapes, the victim is promiscuous or has a bad reputation”). 
Items from the RMA scale have been adapted by a range of researchers, and subsequently 
summed or averaged to produce a single composite score for RMA (e.g., Fox & Potocki, 
2016; Hammond et al., 2011; Vonderhaar & Carmody, 2015).  
Bumby’s (1996) RAPE scale is a 36-item questionnaire (e.g., “If a woman gets drunk at 
a party, it is really her own fault if someone takes advantage of her sexually”), which has 
been used to measure rape-supportive cognition in convicted samples of rapists and non-
convicted community samples. Until recently, the unidimensional use of the RAPE scale was 
generally unchallenged within the literature. However, Hermann, Babchishin, Nunes, Leth-
Steensen, and Cortoni (2012) undertook to examine the underlying factor structure of the 
RAPE scale, finding it to by underpinned by two distinct factors. The first – excusing rape – 
comprised of items that appeared to shift blame away from rape perpetrators and placed 
responsibility onto their victims (e.g., “The reason a lot of women say ‘no’ to sex is because 
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they don’t want to seem loose”). The second factor – justifying rape – comprised of items 
that minimises the negative effects or wrongfulness of rape (e.g., “I believe that if a woman 
lets a man kiss her and touch her sexually, she should be willing to go all the way”).  
These two RAPE scale factors were found to be differentially related to static (Static-
99; Hanson & Thornton, 2000) and dynamic (Stable-2000; Hanson, Harris, Scott, & Helmus, 
2007) risk of sexual offending. For example, excusing rape cognitions were unrelated to 
either of this risk assessment instruments. Likewise, justifying rape cognitions were unrelated 
to static risk but strongly associated with dynamic risk. These different correlation trends 
support the distinctiveness of the two factors, both theoretically and from the perspective of 
their practical implications. 
In spite of this established knowledge, Hermann et al.’s (2012) two-factor structure of 
the RAPE scale has not been explored in relation to its ability to explain judgements of rape 
in non-custodial or non-offending samples. As such, we sought to build upon Hermann et 
al.’s (2012) work by extending it into the social domain by examining judgements of rape 
scenarios (rather than investigating the links between rape-supportive cognition and risk of 
rape perpetration). This is of particular importance given some established work examining 
the potential effects of rape-supportive cognitions in these contexts. Our focus on the RAPE 
scale is driven by this new factor analysis of the measure, as well as its widespread use within 
this area of research, and its apparent resistance to socially-desirable responding (Hermann et 
al., 2012). 
In non-offending populations, rape-supportive cognitions have been associated with 
future sexual aggression (Thompson, Koss, Kingree, Goree, & Rice, 2011). More relevant to 
the present study, rape-supportive cognitions have also been implicated in leniency being 
shown towards the perpetrators of sexual aggressions. The endorsement of rape myths (e.g., 
that victims are responsible if they have consumed alcohol, or attractive women cannot be 
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assaulted, or are in some way responsible for their victimisation) is associated with higher 
levels of victim blame and lesser perceptions of perpetrator responsibility (Gerger, Kley, 
Bohner, & Siebler, 2007; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010; Süssenbach, 2016; Temkin & Krahé, 
2008). Not only has this effect been observed in explicit (self-report) judgements, but the 
acceptance of such rape myths has also been found to lead to more severe judgements of 
cases that concur to the ‘real rape’ stereotype at the implicit level (Süssenbach, Albrecht, & 
Bohner, 2017). Further, two papers by Süssenbach and colleagues have reported how 
participants high on RMA (1) selectively attend to information that focuses on a rape victim 
(vs. a defendant), (2) and pay more attention (using eye-tracking methods) to victims than 
defendants, and (3) attended to ‘real rape’ cues in an image of an alleged crime scene quicker 
and with greater ease than cues not associated with this stereotype (Süssenbach, Bohner, & 
Eyssel, 2012; Süssenbach, Eyssel, Rees, & Bohner, 2017). 
The present study set out to examine whether Hermann et al.’s (2012) two-factor RAPE 
scale structure could account for differences about specific date rape scenarios. We used a 
psychometrically-guided online experimental design by assigning male and female 
participants to one of two date rape vignettes with one key manipulation differentiating these 
– who paid the bill? In line with the two-factor view of the RAPE scale, we predicted that 
participants who endorse ‘excusing rape’ cognitions to a greater degree will suggest that a 
rapist is less guilty in a date rape scenario if the female victim paid for the bill. This is 
because participants who endorse these beliefs may infer her paying as an expression of 
sexual or romantic interest in her date. In contrast, we predicted that participants who endorse 
‘justifying rape’ cognitions to a greater degree will suggest that a rapist is less guilty if the 
male perpetrator paid for the bill. This is because participants who endorse these beliefs may 
view the perpetrator as being entitled to sexual recompense following his gesture of paying 
on their date. 
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Methods 
Design 
To examine the effects of participants’ sex, age, and rape-supportive cognitions in 
judgements of a date rape scenario, this study adopted a pseudo-experimental method and a 
between-subjects design. To the participants, it took the form of an anonymous online survey 
using the Qualtrics system, which sought to understand “views of sexual relations on a first 
date”.  
Two vignettes were used to gather judgements of date rape. In the first, the male paid 
for the bill on the date (the ‘Perpetrator Paid’ condition), while in the second, the female paid 
for the bill (the ‘Victim Paid’ condition). We ran two linear multiple regression analyses for 
each scenario. In each of these, the first four assessed variables (sex, age, excusing rape 
cognitions, and justifying rape cognitions) were entered as predictors, with judgements of the 
vignettes as the criterion. The first model was directed towards explaining the variance in 
judgements made at the explicit level using a self-report method. The second model was 
directed towards explaining judgements made at the implicit level using an IAT. 
 
Participants 
We sought to recruit a large sample of young people (inclusion criteria were that participants 
were aged between 18-35 years to reflect the ecological context of the scenarios used in the 
study, with a good command of written English). Two of the authors used their positions as 
undergraduate researchers to recruit appropriate-age participants through their personal and 
social networks. Advertisements were placed on various social networking sites, such as their 
personal Facebook and Twitter feeds, and UK pages of the microblogging website, Reddit. 
Volunteers were also sought through direct approach on the campus of a large city-centre 
university, where researchers used laptops to recruit participants in quiet public areas (e.g., 
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cafés and private work spaces). Recruitment was also supplemented using an institutional 
research participation scheme, whereby undergraduate psychology students were able to take 
part in research projects in exchange for partial course credit (n = 16; all other participants 
received no incentives). 
A total of 256 people started the online survey, though three of these were removed for 
being over the age of 35 years. Of the 253 eligible participants, 19 were removed from the 
sample for not fully completing the RAPE scale, and five participants were removed as they 
failed to complete the scenario judgement questions. These were both taken as an indication 
of study withdrawal, as per the instructions included on the first page of the study survey. 
Finally, twelve participants were excluded for failing the survey’s attention checks (see 
Materials section, below). This left a total of 217 participants (51% female; Mage = 29.94 
years; SD = 3.93) in the sample for inclusion in the analyses. All participants were naïve to 
the aims of the study prior to taking part.  
 
Measures 
Demographic questions.  In order to protect the anonymity of participants, only key 
demographic information (sex and age) was requested from participants. 
 
Bumby RAPE scale. We used Bumby’s (1996) RAPE scale as a measure of 
participants’ rape-supportive cognitions about women and sex. As already described, the 
RAPE scale is comprised of 36 items designed to tap into attitudes and cognitions that serve 
to excuse, rationalise, justify, or minimise the effects of rape. Each item is posed as a 
statement, for which participants provide their level of agreement on using a four-point scale 
anchored from strongly disagree to strongly agree. We calculated average scores (range = 1-
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4; high scores indicate greater levels of rape-supportive) for the RAPE scale in the present 
study. 
 
Date rape scenarios.  Two parallel versions of a date rape scenario were written for the 
purposes of this study. These scenarios depicted a first date between two people (Adam and 
Gemma) who met on the smartphone dating app Tinder. They went out to dinner and ended 
the night back in Gemma’s apartment, where a coercive sexual interaction took place. Both 
scenarios were identical with the exception of who paid for the dinner bill. The exact wording 
was as follows (manipulated wording is presented in square brackets “[…]”): 
 
Adam and Gemma met on the popular dating app Tinder, and felt there was a spark 
between them. After spending about a week chatting within the app, they arrange to 
meet up for a date so that they could get to know each other better in person. 
 
Both Adam and Gemma were excited about the date, and dressed to impress. Adam 
wore a shirt and jacket, while Gemma bought a new dress specifically for the date. 
They mutually decided to go for a meal at a local upmarket restaurant, which was 
known for serving high quality food in a romantic setting. The conversation was 
flowing on the date, and they were getting on well. They both ordered an expensive 
meal. Adam had a steak, while Gemma ordered a lobster. After three courses and a 
bottle of wine between them, they decide to settle to bill and leave. Adam [Gemma] 
paid for the meal, which came to just under £150.  
 
Gemma was walking home, and so to make sure she got there safely, Adam went 
with her. On the walk back, they discussed how much they both enjoyed the date, 
and that they should do it again soon. 
 
Just before arriving at Gemma’s house, it began to rain, so they both decided it 
would be a good idea for Adam to go inside until it stops. Whilst they wait for the 
rain to stop, Gemma made drinks for them to warm up.  
 
They talked some more about their shared interests, and seemed to be getting on 
well. During the conversation, Adam touched Gemma’s thigh. She giggled, and 
moved his hand away. After some more chatting, Adam started to move closer to 
Gemma, but she retracted to the edge of the sofa they were sharing. In one silence, 
Adam tried to kiss Gemma. In order to not look rude, she returned the kiss, thinking 
that this would signal the end of the date and Adam would leave. However, Adam 
then began to progress the interaction, and indicated that he wanted to have sex with 
Gemma. Gemma expressed that she did not want to have sex on the first date. Adam 
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continued to kiss Gemma, and she got tired of telling him she didn’t want to go 
further. Eventually they had sex there on the sofa.  
 
After finishing, Adam finished his drink, kissed Gemma on the forehead, and went 
home, as the rain had stopped. Before leaving, he said that he hoped to see her for 
another date. 
 
Three free-text response questions were used as an attention check. These questions 
asked participants to confirm three pivotal details: (1) Where did Adam and Gemma meet?1; 
(2) Who paid for the bill?; and (3) How much did the bill come to? Participants were retained 
in the study if they provided the correct answer to question two (our key manipulated detail) 
and at least one of the other questions. 
 
Explicit scenario judgements.  Consistent with Süssenbach et al. (2017) we used four 
questions to gather information about participants’ explicit (self-reported) judgements of the 
date rape scenarios. We asked: “How responsible is Adam for what happened?”, “How 
responsible is Gemma for what happened?”, “Is Adam guilty of rape?”, and “If he was 
convicted, how severe a sentence should Adam receive?”. Each question was rated using an 
11-point scale anchored from 0 (not at all responsible/absolutely no/lightest possible 
punishment) to 10 (completely responsible/absolutely yes/harshest possible punishment). We 
reverse-coded questions one, three, and four, such that high scores indicated judgements of 
innocence. All items were highly and significantly correlated (rs ≥ .40, ps < .001). As such, 
we averaged participants’ responses across all four items to compute a single ‘explicit 
innocence judgement’ score (possible range = 0-10; α = 0.83). 
 
                                                          
1 During the analysis of our data, we found that a combination of “Tinder” (the intended response) and “a 
restaurant” (where the couple actually met up in person) were provided. We decided to count both of these 
responses as correct. 
11 
 
Implicit scenario judgements.  In addition to self-reported judgements, we also 
assessed implicit judgements of the date rape scenarios using an IAT run from within the 
survey software using iatgen (Carpenter et al., 2018). This software uses HTML code to 
embed an IAT into an online survey built using Qualtrics. Iatgen runs the IAT procedure (and 
data cleaning/scoring) in accordance with Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) guidelines. 
The IAT contains stimuli related to both targets (here, “Adam” and “Gemma”) and 
evaluations (here, “innocent” and “guilty”). Stimuli in the present study were words that 
correspond to our targets and evaluations (see Table 1 for full word lists). The aim of an IAT 
is to examine how quickly participants can classify a target with a given evaluation when 
they share response keys (here, the “E” and “I” keyboard keys). During the IAT, stimuli are 
presented in the centre of the screen, one at a time, and classified by participants as quickly 
and accurately as possible using the appropriate response keys. 
 
Table 1. IAT stimuli 
Targets Evaluations 
Adam Gemma Innocent Guilty 
Male Female Honest Criminal 
Man Her Blameless Culpable 
Him Lady Faultless Wrong 
Bloke Woman Virtuous Responsible 
Adam Gemma Innocent Guilty 
Note. Words were presented in a random order in each block until the required number of 
trials was reached. 
 
In the present study, the IAT was made up of seven blocks. The first two blocks allow 
participants to practice classifying targets (Block 1; 20 trials) and evaluations (Block 2; 20 
trials) in isolation. These blocks familiarise participants to the stimuli to be used later in the 
task. Next come two combined blocks, one of which is a practice (Block 3; 20 trials) and one 
in which data contributes to the scoring of the IAT (Block 4; 40 trials). In these combined 
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blocks, evaluation categories are linked with target categories (e.g., “Adam OR Innocent” and 
“Gemma OR Guilty”), with each pair sharing a response key. After this, the evaluation 
categories switch sides. Following a practice of this new position in isolation (Block 5; 20 
trials), before Blocks 6 and 7 follow the same format as Blocks 3 and 4 with the evaluation 
terms being paired with the other targets. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible for each 
stimulus word. Errors were met with a red cross, with participants having to correct their 
response before moving on to the next stimulus. The order of target/evaluation pairings (and 
the initial left/right position of the target names) was counterbalanced between participants. 
 
Procedure 
After being recruited via the methods described previously, participants clicked a URL link to 
the online survey containing the project questions. They first read an information sheet 
detailing the general aims of the project (“investigating judgements of sexual relations on a 
first date”) and were required to give affirmative consent to participate by selecting a box and 
accepting the inclusion criteria. Next, participants provided their demographic information, 
before completing the RAPE scale. After this, participants were randomly allocated to one of 
the date rape scenarios. The button required to move on to the next page of the survey was 
disabled for 60 seconds in order to further control the levels of attention paid to these stories. 
Participants then answered the attention check questions, before providing their judgements 
of the scenario they read. The order of the explicit and implicit judgement tasks was 
counterbalanced between participants. 
All participants received a comprehensive debrief (along with information about rape 
support services) upon completion.  This procedure was approved by an institutional ethical 
review committee prior to data collection. 
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Results 
Bumby RAPE scale factors 
Given that no attempts to replicate Hermann et al.’s (2012) two-factor structure of the RAPE 
scale have previously been made, we sought to interrogate this model using a confirmatory 
factor analysis before undertaking our planned analyses.2 We conducted this analysis in Amos 
for SPSS, using Hermann et al.’s (2012) 36-item structure as the default model. This model 
was a poor fit to the data provided by our sample, χ2 (463) = 1806.84, p < .001, CFI = .65, 
RMSEA = .10. 
Following from this poor fit, we ran a principal components analysis on our RAPE 
scale data. The sample size here equates to approximately seven observations per scale item, 
exceeding Costello and Osborne’s (2005) recommended minimum of five observations. The 
scree plot suggested 2-3 components should be retained in the model. Looking for the most 
parsimonious model, and in line with Hermann et al. (2012), we ran the PCA with an 
instruction to extract two components using an oblique (promax) rotation. The two extracted 
components explained 38.19% of the variance in RAPE scale scores. Item loadings for each 
of the two components are presented in Table 2. 
There was substantial overlap between the loadings onto each factor when comparing 
the models produced by Hermann et al.’s (2012) data and our own (Table 3). In the present 
study, we used the item loadings produced by our own analysis, as this was the model we 
could be most confident in. Given the substantial item overlap between our model and that 
reported by Hermann et al. (2012), we retained the labels ‘excusing rape’ (15 items; α = .85) 
and ‘justifying rape’ (17 items; α = .90) for these components. 
 
 
                                                          
2 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for this recommendation, which has greatly improved our 
confidence in the findings reported in subsequent sections of this paper. 
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Table 2. Item loadings for the RAPE scale in the present sample 
  Factor 1 
Justifying Rape 
Factor 2 
Excusing Rape 
1 Men who commit rape are probably responding 
to a lot of stress in their lives, and raping helps 
reduce that stress 
.144 .367 
2 Women who get raped probably deserved it .480 .262 
3 Women generally want sex no matter how they 
can get it 
.491 .479 
4 Since prostitutes sell their bodies for sexual 
purposes anyway, it is not as bad if someone 
forces them into sex 
.569 .310 
5 If a woman does not resist strongly to sexual 
advances, she is probably willing to have sex 
.612 .593 
6 Women often falsely accuse men of rape .427 .601 
7 A lot of women who get raped had “bad 
reputations” in the first place 
.386 .438 
8 If women did not sleep around so much, they 
would be less likely to get raped 
.575 .336 
9 If a woman gets drunk at a party, it is really her 
own fault if someone takes advantage of her 
sexually 
.625 .408 
10 When women wear tight clothes, short skirts, 
and no bra or underwear, they are just asking for 
sex 
.747 .397 
11 A lot of women claim they were raped just 
because they want attention 
.440 .621 
12 Victims of rape are usually a little bit to blame 
for what happens 
.673 .445 
13 If a man has had sex with a woman before, then 
he should be able to have sex with her any time 
he wants 
.601 .249 
14 Just fantasizing about forcing someone to have 
sex isn’t all that bad since no one is really being 
hurt 
.380 .560 
15 Women who go to bars a lot are mainly looking 
to have sex 
.610 .481 
16 A lot of times, when women say “no,” they are 
just playing hard to get and really mean “yes” 
.605 .490 
17 Part of a wife’s duty is to satisfy her husband 
sexually whenever he wants it, whether or not 
she is in the mood 
.703 .372 
18 Often, a woman reports rape long after the fact 
because she gets mad at the man she had sex 
with and is trying to get back at him 
.577 .542 
19 As long as a man does not slap or punch a 
woman in the process, forcing her to have sex is 
not as bad 
.502 .172 
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20 When a women gets raped more than once, she is 
probably doing something to cause it 
.655 .395 
21 Women who get raped will eventually forget 
about it and get on with their lives 
.467 .296 
22 On a date, when a man spends a lot of money on 
a woman, the woman ought to at least give the 
man something in return sexually 
.816 .337 
23 I believe that if a woman lets a man kiss her and 
touch her sexually, she should be willing to go 
all the way 
.878 .490 
24 When women act like they are too good for men, 
most men probably think about raping the 
women to put them in their place 
.485 .188 
25 I believe that society and the courts are too tough 
on rapists 
.415 .459 
26 Most women are sluts and get what they deserve .708 .310 
27 Before the police investigate a woman’s claim of 
rape, it is a good idea to find out what she was 
wearing, if she had been drinking, and what kind 
of person she is 
.543 .619 
28 Generally, rape is not planned—a lot of times it 
just happens 
.167 .527 
29 If a person tells himself that he will never rape 
again, then he probably won’t 
.248 .551 
30 A lot of men who rape do so because they are 
deprived of sex 
.275 .698 
31 The reason a lot of women say “no” to sex is 
because they don’t want to seem loose 
.445 .615 
32 If a woman goes to the home of a man on the 
first date, she probably wants to have sex with 
him 
.471 .637 
33 Many women have a secret desire to be forced 
into having sex 
.519 .576 
34 Most of the men who rape have stronger sexual 
urges than other men 
.236 .624 
35 I believe that any woman can prevent herself 
from being raped if she really wants to 
.430 .544 
36 Most of the time, the only reason a man commits 
rape is because he was sexually assaulted as a 
child 
.093 .495 
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Table 3. Discrepancies between items loading onto components in Hermann et al. (2012) 
compared to the present sample 
  Hermann et al. Present Sample 
1 Men who commit rape are probably responding 
to a lot of stress in their lives, and raping helps 
reduce that stress 
Excusing* Excusing 
2 Women who get raped probably deserved it Justifying Justifying 
3 Women generally want sex no matter how they 
can get it 
Excusing - 
4 Since prostitutes sell their bodies for sexual 
purposes anyway, it is not as bad if someone 
forces them into sex 
Justifying** Justifying 
5 If a woman does not resist strongly to sexual 
advances, she is probably willing to have sex 
Excusing Justifying 
6 Women often falsely accuse men of rape Excusing Excusing 
7 A lot of women who get raped had “bad 
reputations” in the first place 
Excusing - 
8 If women did not sleep around so much, they 
would be less likely to get raped 
Justifying** Justifying 
9 If a woman gets drunk at a party, it is really her 
own fault if someone takes advantage of her 
sexually 
Excusing Justifying 
10 When women wear tight clothes, short skirts, 
and no bra or underwear, they are just asking for 
sex 
Excusing Justifying 
11 A lot of women claim they were raped just 
because they want attention 
Excusing Excusing 
12 Victims of rape are usually a little bit to blame 
for what happens 
Excusing Justifying 
13 If a man has had sex with a woman before, then 
he should be able to have sex with her any time 
he wants 
Justifying Justifying 
14 Just fantasizing about forcing someone to have 
sex isn’t all that bad since no one is really being 
hurt 
Justifying Excusing 
15 Women who go to bars a lot are mainly looking 
to have sex 
Excusing Justifying 
16 A lot of times, when women say “no,” they are 
just playing hard to get and really mean “yes” 
Justifying Justifying 
17 Part of a wife’s duty is to satisfy her husband 
sexually whenever he wants it, whether or not 
she is in the mood 
Justifying Justifying 
18 Often, a woman reports rape long after the fact 
because she gets mad at the man she had sex 
with and is trying to get back at him 
Excusing - 
19 As long as a man does not slap or punch a 
woman in the process, forcing her to have sex is 
not as bad 
Justifying Justifying 
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20 When a women gets raped more than once, she is 
probably doing something to cause it 
Justifying Excusing 
21 Women who get raped will eventually forget 
about it and get on with their lives 
Justifying Justifying 
22 On a date, when a man spends a lot of money on 
a woman, the woman ought to at least give the 
man something in return sexually 
Justifying Justifying 
23 I believe that if a woman lets a man kiss her and 
touch her sexually, she should be willing to go 
all the way 
Justifying Justifying 
24 When women act like they are too good for men, 
most men probably think about raping the 
women to put them in their place 
Justifying Justifying 
25 I believe that society and the courts are too tough 
on rapists 
Justifying* - 
26 Most women are sluts and get what they deserve Justifying Justifying 
27 Before the police investigate a woman’s claim of 
rape, it is a good idea to find out what she was 
wearing, if she had been drinking, and what kind 
of person she is 
Excusing Excusing 
28 Generally, rape is not planned—a lot of times it 
just happens 
Excusing Excusing 
29 If a person tells himself that he will never rape 
again, then he probably won’t 
Excusing Excusing 
30 A lot of men who rape do so because they are 
deprived of sex 
Excusing Excusing 
31 The reason a lot of women say “no” to sex is 
because they don’t want to seem loose 
Excusing Excusing 
32 If a woman goes to the home of a man on the 
first date, she probably wants to have sex with 
him 
Excusing Excusing 
33 Many women have a secret desire to be forced 
into having sex 
Excusing Excusing 
34 Most of the men who rape have stronger sexual 
urges than other men 
Excusing Excusing 
35 I believe that any woman can prevent herself 
from being raped if she really wants to 
Justifying* Excusing 
36 Most of the time, the only reason a man commits 
rape is because he was sexually assaulted as a 
child 
Excusing Excusing 
Note.  * No significant item loading in Hermann et al. (0.40 threshold); ** Significant cross-
loading on to both factors in Hermann et al.; - indicates no significant item loading in the 
present sample. 
 
Baseline RAPE scale scores 
Before conducting our main analyses, we sought to establish whether there were any 
differences between the two vignette conditions in relation to their endorsement of either 
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factor on the RAPE scale. We entered both excusing rape and justifying rape cognitions as 
dependent variables into a 2 (Participant Sex: Male vs. Female) x 2 (Vignette: Perpetrator 
Paid vs. Victim Paid) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Baseline RAPE scale factor scores, by vignette and participant sex 
 Male Participants Female Participants 
 Perpetrator Paid 
(n = 57) 
Victim Paid  
(n = 49) 
Perpetrator Paid  
(n = 56) 
Victim Paid  
(n = 55) 
Excusing rape 1.77 (0.48) 1.82 (0.42) 1.45 (0.29) 1.51 (0.37) 
Justifying rape 1.22 (0.28) 1.30 (0.40) 1.06 (0.08) 1.09 (0.19) 
Note. Figures listed represent estimated marginal means from the multivariate analysis, with 
±1 SE in parentheses. 
 
There was a significant multivariate effect for Participant Sex, Wilks’ λ = 0.85, F(2, 
212) = 19.11, p < .001, η2p = 0.15. Here, the univariate tests demonstrated that male 
participants scored higher for both factors; Excusing Rape: F(1, 213) = 3.98, p < .001, η2p = 
0.14; Justifying Rape: F(1, 213) = 26.60, p < .001, η2p = 0.11.  
In relation to Vignette group, there was no multivariate effect, Wilks’ λ = 0.99, F(2, 
212) = 1.12, p = .327, η2p = 0.01, and no univariate main effect in relation to either factor, 
Excusing Rape: F(1, 213) = 1.10, p = .295, η2p < 0.01; Justifying Rape: F(1, 213) = 2.22, p = 
.138, η2p = 0.01. Similarly, there was no multivariate Sex*Vignette interaction effect, Wilks’ 
λ = 1.00, F(2, 212) = 0.38, p = .684, η2p < 0.01, and no specific interaction when examining 
scores on each factor, Excusing Rape: F(1, 213) < 0.01, p = .984, η2p < 0.01; Justifying Rape: 
F(1, 213) = 0.48, p = .490, η2p < 0.01. 
What these results indicate is that male participants scored higher in relation to both 
types of rape-supportive cognition as compared to females. However, levels of these 
cognitions (both specific to each participant sex group, and when collapsing all participants 
together) did not differ at baseline between each Vignette group.  
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Explicit judgements of date rape scenarios 
The first of our regression analyses pertained to explicit judgements of the two rape scenarios 
used in this study. To begin, we conducted correlational analyses between both types of rape-
supportive cognitions and participants’ self-reported judgements of each vignette. For both 
vignettes, there were strong positive correlations between both RAPE scale factors (though 
these correlations fell just short of indicating collinearity), and moderate positive correlations 
between both types of rape-supportive cognition and judgements of the perpetrator’s 
innocence (Table 5). We further established that the mean explicit innocence judgements for 
the ‘Perpetrator Paid’ scenario (M = 3.15, SD = 2.26) and ‘Victim Paid’ scenario (M = 3.27, 
SD = 2.09) were not significantly different, t(215) = 0.41, p = .684, d = 0.06. 
 
Table 5. Zero-order correlations between excusing rape and justifying rape cognitions and 
perpetrator innocence judgements, by vignette  
 Perpetrator Paid (n = 113) Victim Paid (n = 104) 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1. Excusing rape - .70** .24* - .62** .49** 
2. Justifying rape .70** - .15* .62** - .37** 
3. Innocence judgement .42** .36** - .41** .35** - 
Note. Coefficients below the diagonal refer to correlations with explicit (self-report) 
judgements, while coefficients above the diagonal refer to correlations with implicit (IAT) 
scores 
* p < .005     ** p < .001 
 
These correlations indicate that linear multiple regression was an acceptable method for 
analysis. As such, we entered excusing rape and justifying rape cognitions as predictors with 
participant sex and age in a regression model for each vignette, with explicit innocence 
judgements as the dependent variable. We included sex and age owing to the observed 
differences in rape-supportive cognition levels between the sexes (Table 4), and recent 
commentaries about the #MeToo and Title XI college rape response movements, which are 
typically being driven by younger millennials and iGen-aged students on university 
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campuses.3 Both models explained a significant proportion of the variance in explicit 
innocence judgements; Perpetrator Paid: adjusted R2 = .228, F(4, 106) = 9.11, p < .001; 
Victim Paid: adjusted R2 = .196, F(4, 98) = 7.20, p < .001. Coefficients within each 
regression model are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Regression coefficients explaining innocence judgements of the perpetrator, by 
vignette 
 Perpetrator Paid Victim Paid 
 B (SE) β p B (SE) β p 
Explicit (self-report) judgements     
Sex 0.37 (0.41) 0.08 .370 0.67 (0.41) 0.16 .108 
Age 0.15 (0.05) 0.24 .005 0.07 (0.05) 0.13 .185 
Excusing rape 1.69 (0.63) 0.32 .009 1.41 (0.59) 0.29 .018 
Justifying rape 1.17 (1.24) 0.11 .348 0.57 (0.78) 0.09 .466 
Implicit (IAT) judgements     
Sex 0.32 (0.08) 0.42 < .001 0.12 (0.07) 0.17 .091 
Age 0.00 (0.01) < 0.01 .954 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 .874 
Excusing rape 0.15 (0.11) 0.17 .191 0.32 (0.10) 0.38 .002 
Justifying rape -0.22 (0.23) -0.13 .327 0.09 (0.13) 0.08 .520 
Note. Sex: 0 = female, 1 = male. B = unstandardized beta-value (±1 SE in parentheses). β = 
standardised beta-value. Significant values are also presented in bold typeface. 
 
Examining the coefficients, it appears that age, β = 0.24, t(106) = 2.86, p = .005, and 
excusing rape cognitions, β = 0.32, t(106) = 2.67, p = .009, were the only significant 
predictors of innocence judgements when the perpetrator paid for the bill, with older age and 
greater levels of excusing cognitions explaining higher levels of perceived innocence,. When 
the victim paid for the bill on the date, higher levels of the excusing rape cognitions 
significantly explained greater levels of perceived innocence, β = 0.29, t(99) = 2.41, p = .018. 
These data are only partially supportive of our hypotheses. That is, justifying rape cognitions 
did not have any effect in increasing innocence judgements when the perpetrator paid for the 
                                                          
3 While we believe that the vast majority of our participants were UK-based as a result of our data collection 
strategies, recent work has suggested that generation-based differences in political outlook are consistent across 
cultures (Twenge, 2018), hence the inclusion of the age variable in these analyses. 
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bill. However, when the victim paid for the bill (potentially indicative of sexual interest in the 
perpetrator in the lead up to the rape), innocence judgements were positively associated with 
increased levels of excusing rape cognitions. 
 
Implicit judgements of date rape scenarios 
As observed by Süssenbach et al. (2017), rape-supportive cognition (operationalised as 
RMA) was associated with higher perceived innocence at the implicit level when a rape 
scenario was framed in a manner consistent with the ‘real rape’ stereotype. We sought to 
examine whether the subtle priming of different cues related to specific clusters of rape-
supportive cognition could contribute to increased innocence judgements at the implicit level. 
 
IAT scoring.  Using the iatgen applet (Carpenter et al., 2018), we computed 
standardised D scores for each participant according to their response latencies as they 
completed the IAT. A score of 0 on this scoring procedure indicated no difference between 
implicit judgements of guilt or innocence. Positive scores indicated implicit judgements of 
innocence, while negative scores indicated an increased propensity to see the perpetrator as 
guilty at an implicit level. The applet provides a score of ‘NA’ for participants who should be 
removed from analyses on the basis of indiscriminate responding (i.e., they responded too 
quickly on a significant proportion of trials or made a large number of errors). A total of 10 
participants (4.61% of the sample) were dropped from subsequent analyses for this reason 
(revised N = 207). 
After computing these D scores, we conducted a series of one-sample t-tests in order to 
determine the validity of the IAT in the present study. The mean D score for the sample as a 
whole was -0.43 (SD = 0.37), which was significantly different from zero, t(206) = -16.58, p 
< .001, d = -1.15. This indicates that, across the sample, the implicit scores were oriented in 
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the direction of seeing the perpetrator as guilty, providing evidence of the validity of this 
method for establishing innocence judgements. The size of this effect was consistent in both 
scenario conditions; Perpetrator Paid: M = -0.47 (SD = 0.38), t(104) = -12.60, p < .001, d = -
1.23; Victim Paid: M = -0.39 (SD = 0.36), t(101) = -10.89, p < .001, d = -1.08. The difference 
in the average levels of implicit innocence judgements was not statistically different when 
comparing the two scenario conditions, t(205) = 1.61, p = .109, d = 0.22. 
 
Correlational and regression analyses.  As with the explicit judgement analyses, we 
first examined the extent to which each type of rape-supportive cognition was associated with 
participants’ IAT scores. As with the self-report data previously reported, both types of 
cognition were significantly and positively associated with innocence judgements at the 
implicit level, particularly within the Victim Paid condition (Table 5).  
We next repeated the same linear multiple regression analyses as were run in relation to 
the explicit judgements previously reported. Again, the collection of participant sex, age, 
excusing rape cognitions, and justifying rape cognitions accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance in implicit innocence judgements of both vignettes; Perpetrator 
Paid: adjusted R2 = .176, F(4, 98) = 6.44, p < .001; Victim Paid: adjusted R2 = .237, F(4, 96) 
= 8.77, p < .001. Regression coefficients for both models are presented in Table 6. 
When the perpetrator paid for the bill on the date, he was seen as significantly more 
innocent at the implicit level by male participants than female participants, β = 0.42, t(108) = 
4.30, p < .001. No other variables uniquely explained variance in implicit judgements of this 
scenario. However, when the victim paid for the bill, increased endorsement of excusing rape 
cognitions were significantly associated with greater implicit innocence judgements, β = 
0.38, t(99) = 3.23, p = .002. These results are consistent with the explicit innocence 
judgements, in that rape-supportive cognitions had no effect on judgements when the 
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perpetrator paid for the bill, but excusing rape cognitions explained an increased propensity 
to view the perpetrator as innocent when the victim paid for the bill. These findings are again 
partially supportive of our hypotheses. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we sought to examine the divergent explanatory effects of excusing rape and 
justifying rape cognitions on two different date rape scenarios. Consistent with the definitions 
advanced by Hermann et al.’s (2012) factor analysis of Bumby’s RAPE scale, we 
hypothesised that excusing rape cognitions (but not justifying rape cognitions) would 
contribute to higher innocence judgements when the victim paid for the bill, given that this 
could be inferred as a signal of sexual interest by those high on this type of cognition. In 
contrast, we hypothesised that justifying rape cognitions (but not excusing rape cognitions) 
would explain higher innocence judgements when the perpetrator paid the bill, as this could 
indicate the victim being in the debt of the perpetrator to those high on this type of cognition.  
We found no support for our first hypothesis. When the perpetrator paid for the bill, 
there was no evidence in our data that endorsing justifying rape cognitions enhanced 
perceptions of their innocence at either level of analysis. Instead, explicit judgements were 
influenced by age, with older participants seeing the perpetrator as more innocent. This 
finding may be reflective of younger participants holding a more egalitarian view of 
courtship and the division of responsibility to pay on dates (Lever, Frederick, & Hertz, 2015). 
At the implicit level, enhanced innocence judgements when the perpetrator paid the bill was 
explained by participants’ sex (specifically, being male). This conforms to established 
findings suggesting that men are more likely to find rapists less culpable (and to assign 
greater levels of blame to female victims) than women (Black & Gold, 2008; Grubb & 
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Harrower, 2008; Pinciotti & Orcutt, 2017), but extends this existing body of work into the 
implicit domain. 
However, our data did support our second prediction. That is at both the explicit (self-
report) and implicit (IAT) levels, higher levels of excusing rape cognitions explained 
enhanced perceptions of the perpetrator’s innocence when the victim paid the bill. However, 
justifying rape cognitions were unrelated to judgements of this scenario. These findings 
support the two-factor structure of the RAPE scale that was reported by Hermann et al. 
(2012) and demonstrates how excusing rape and justifying rape cognitions are not only 
distinct from a conceptual standpoint, but also have unique empirical effects on judgements 
of rape scenarios.  
 
Active vs. passive functions of rape-supportive cognitions 
The lack of concordance between our data and the predictions we made on the basis of prior 
theorising – specifically in relation to justifying rape cognitions – raise some interesting 
questions about the nature and function of specific rape-supportive cognitions. The 
endorsement of such beliefs (particularly with regard to rape myth acceptance) has been 
associated with lenient judgements of rape perpetrators (and exaggerated levels of victim 
blame) for several decades (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Bohner et al., 2010; Burt, 1980; Grubb 
& Turner, 2012). However, Hermann et al.’s (2012) factor analysis and subsequent 
explanation of the underlying structure of the RAPE scale allowed for a more nuanced 
examination of the effects of rape-supportive cognition than has previously been possible.  
In this study, we found significant explanatory effects for excusing rape being 
associated with leniency when a victim demonstrated a behaviour that could be linked to 
some degree of romantic interest in the perpetrator (i.e., paying the bill on a date). This effect 
is consistent with Hermann et al.’s (2012) description of excusing rape cognitions. That is, 
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this collection of thoughts is said to reflect a tendency to ascribe complicity in the rape onto 
the victim (e.g., “When women wear tight clothes, short skirts, and no bra or underwear, they 
are just asking for sex”, or more relevant to our investigation “If a woman goes home with a 
man on a first date, she probably wants to have sex with him”). As these cognitions are 
intricately related to the mitigation of rapists’ responsibility (and are thus directly related to 
levels of culpability and guilt), we might expect these opinions to explain judgements of 
others’ sexually coercive behaviour. That is, excusing rape cognitions (or a lack of them) 
might lead people to attempt to explain the behaviours of others in criminal procedures. 
Justifying rape cognitions, in contrast, may be more related to personal actions than in the 
judgements of those behaviours of others. That is, we are responsible for justifying our own 
actions, but not those of other people. This may help us to explain why there was no 
significant effect (or even a slight trend) for justifying rape cognitions to affect judgements in 
the present study.  
If we are to accept this interpretation, we might expect justifying rape cognitions to 
explain judgements of rape if the participants were to be cast in the position of the 
perpetrator. This dichotomy of rape-supportive cognitions based upon the distinction between 
excusing the behaviour of others and justifying the behaviour of oneself points towards a 
motivated view of such beliefs. That is, the extent to which these beliefs have an effect on 
judgements may depend upon the extent to which the perceiver has something to lose on the 
basis of the rape that has been committed. This was an argument also advanced by Szumski, 
Bartels, Beech, and Fisher (2018) who, drawing on Kunda (1990) argued that people may use 
rape-supportive cognitions to rationalise judgements in a situational manner. Bartels (2016) 
set out how this happens in light of immediate emotional states. For example, experiencing 
rejection from a potential sexual partner could lead to negative affect, and as a remedy to this 
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an individual may use such beliefs (or ‘temporary belief states’; Frijda, Mesquita, 
Sonnemans, & van Goozen, 1991) to rationalise or justify sexual coercion. 
More specific to the present study, the explicit agreement with statements such as “A 
lot of times, when women say ‘no,’ they are just playing hard to get and really mean ‘yes’” or 
“I believe that any woman can prevent herself from being raped if she really wants to” (items 
loading onto the justifying rape factor of the RAPE scale; Hermann et al., 2012) is unlikely to 
be widespread within the general population as a result of societal negativity towards sexual 
offenders (for a review, see Harper, Hogue, & Bartels, 2017). As observed by Richards and 
McCartan (2018), people are generally hesitant to explicitly endorse propositions that may 
condone or justify the behaviours of sexually coercive individuals. However, due to this 
societal negativity, the motivation to engage in justification might be more heightened 
if/when one’s own behaviour is in question. That is, justification takes the form of an active 
process to negate cognitive dissonance associated with a conflict between one’s own 
behaviour and that which is expected as a social norm. 
In contrast, agreeing with items such as “If a woman does not resist strongly to sexual 
advances, she is probably willing to have sex” and “Most of the men who rape have stronger 
sexual urges than other men” (items loading onto the excusing rape factor of the RAPE scale; 
Hermann et al., 2012) are broad propositions that invite nuanced responses (rather than 
blanket rejections) in order to avoid generalisation. As such, agreeing with these propositions 
may not actually reflect specific beliefs about women and sexual relations, but rather a lack 
of willingness to completely reject these ideas across the board. With this in mind, the 
endorsement of excusing rape cognitions might take the form of more passive evaluations of 
the situational factors which may be present in many rape cases. 
Support for this distinction between active (justifying) and passive (excusing) rape-
supportive cognition comes from Hermann et al.’s (2012) initial factor analysis of the RAPE 
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scale. They reported that excusing rape cognitions were not significantly related to dynamic 
risk of sexual offending (Stable-2000 scores). However, justifying rape cognitions were 
strongly associated with such risk scores. While this active-passive dichotomy makes 
conceptual sense, further empirical work is necessary to explore these ideas in more depth. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
In this study we used a combination of self-report and indirect measures to examine 
judgements of the innocence of an apparent rape perpetrator in our vignettes. However, we 
only used a self-report measure of rape-supportive cognitions. The reason behind this was to 
use a validated scale that has been found to have the two distinct clusters of rape-supportive 
cognition embedded within it. However, as suggested above there may be concerns over the 
validity of data collected using such self-report measures of these cognitions in this domain 
(though the RAPE scale has been reported to be uncorrelated to measures of social 
desirability; Hermann et al., 2012). As such, examining rape-supportive beliefs at the implicit 
level using indirect measures may be a fruitful avenue in future research. Szumski et al. 
(2018) also made this observation, and we support their argument that emerging dynamic 
measures of implicit cognition (e.g., computer mouse-tracking; Freeman & Ambady, 2010) 
could provide novel insights into rape-supportive cognition – particularly subtle rape 
justification – in a manner that is, by design, free from social desirability biases. This method 
was recently employed by Smith, Treat, Farmer, and McMurray (2018) who found that 
undergraduate males’ mouse trajectories indicated a greater tendency to ascribe sexual 
interest to female models dressed provocatively than conservatively. 
In our discussion of the data here we have advanced an argument in relation to an 
active-passive dichotomy of rape-supportive cognition. This argument requires more detailed 
empirical attention. Some studies that could be run to examine this distinction may involve 
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shifting the perspective of participants. That is, in line with the active role of rape 
justification, it may be the case that placing participants in the position of a rape perpetrator 
(or portraying the perpetrator as a member of a valued ingroup) may increase the extent to 
which this cluster of beliefs contributes to lenient judgements. Not only might this have 
implications for explaining rape perpetration, but also may provide psychological insights in 
relation to why institutional abuse is explained away or covered up in many settings 
(Edwards, Turchik, Dardis, Reynolds, & Gidycz, 2011; Harper & Perkins, 2018; Sabina & 
Ho, 2014). 
It may also be interesting to examine whether other scenario details might trigger the 
enactment of specific rape-supportive cognitions. For example, we found no effects of 
justifying rape cognitions on judgements when the perpetrator paid for the bill. This was 
contrary to expectations. However, if we were to embed other cues related to justifying rape, 
such as an expectation from the victim for the perpetrator to pay (or, more explicitly, the 
victim’s refusal to pay the bill), we might prime justifying rape cognitions in a more direct 
way. This is due to the items making up the justifying rape factor being relation to both male 
sexual entitlement and hostility towards women (e.g., “When women act like they are too 
good for men, most men probably think about raping the women to put them in their place”). 
Further, we did not directly assess whether paying the bill was actually viewed as an indicator 
of perceived sexual interest. Future studies should explicitly examine this manipulation in a 
direct way. 
A key limitation of our work is a lack of ability to replicate Hermann et al.’s (2012) 
precise two-factor structure to the RAPE scale. While our sample’s data did support a two-
factor solution, the items loaded differently in our sample as compared to that used by 
Hermann et al. (2012). This difference may be reflective of the difference in sampling 
between our two studies. That is, Hermann et al. (2012) used a sample of men convicted of 
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sexual offences. In contrast, our sample was comprised of non-offending male and female 
community members. Future research might look to examine whether the dimensionality of 
rape-supportive cognitions using larger samples, and investigate the consistency of this 
dimensionality across offending and non-offending samples. 
Away from conceptual advances of our research, it is also necessary to acknowledge 
some of the inherent limitations in our work. We made use of a limited age sample (18-35 
years) in order to reflect the ecological characteristics of our scenarios. That is, the fact that 
our protagonists met on a smartphone dating app led us to want to control for age in our 
sample, given that 83% of Tinder users are below the age of 35 years (McGrath, 2015). 
Future research might make use of a broader range of scenarios and examine the effects of 
excusing and justifying rape cognitions across the lifespan, such as to have clearer links to 
crucial criminal justice contexts (e.g., jury decision-making). Our data may also be subject to 
some of the contextual factors embedded within the vignettes. That is, some of the variance 
in judgements may be explained by participants’ views about online dating or dating apps in 
general. 
For ethical reasons, we turned off IP address tracking for the online survey in order to 
increase participants’ anonymity and encourage honest responding. However, this means that 
we cannot be sure about the precise locations of where our survey was completed, or the 
national homogeneity of our sample. While we have strong reasons to believe that the vast 
majority of our sample were based in the UK (owing to the location of the research team and 
data collection methods employed). However, the use of online fora may have led to a small 
proportion of the sample coming from other countries. This could be an issue given the 
different legal definitions of rape in different jurisdictions. Future research might balance the 
need to maintain participant anonymity with tighter control over jurisdiction-specific 
definitions of rape. One way to do this may be to utilize multi-lab data collection initiatives, 
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such as the Psychological Science Accelerator (Chartier, McCarthy, & Urry, 2018), which 
enables research teams from across the world to collaborate on single projects to bring small 
samples together into large-scale multi-site international studies.  
 
Conclusions 
The present study sought to examine the empirical validity of Hermann et al.’s (2012) two-
factor structure of Bumby’s (1996) RAPE scale of rape-supportive cognitions. Consistent 
with this conceptualisation, we found that greater excusing rape cognitions explained 
exaggerated innocence judgements when the victim paid for the bill on a first date which 
subsequently ended in a rape. However, we found no evidence that rape was justified when 
the perpetrator paid for the bill. These findings suggest that excusing and justifying rape 
cognitions do represent empirically distinct clusters of rape-supportive cognitions about 
women and sex. The practical effects of this distinction, coupled with a theoretical 
exploration of how and under what conditions they are activated, should be the topic of future 
research in order to reduce the effects of such beliefs in the perpetration and judgement of 
rape cases. 
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